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UE Local 277 's 
Strike at Morse 
Cutting Tool 
By Dan Swinney 
In the Spring of 1982, a small local union took 
on a conglomerate giant and won. What initially 
appeared as a battle over concessions at Morse 
Cutting Tool, a subsidiary of Gulf+Western 
in New Bedford, Massachusetts, became a 
broad-based community/labor fight against the 
rights of capital. Careful research by the In-
dustrial Cooperative Association (ICA) docu-
mented G+W's disinvestment and kept the com-
pany on the defensive for the strike's thirteen-
week duration. The victory of United Electrical 
Workers Union Local 277 showed that imagina-
tive leadership and militant unionists can over-
come corporate power even in the midst of a new 
depression. This strike deserves close study by all 
those interested in the labor movement. 
Because of the fragmented character of the la-
bor movement and our lack of access to G + W's 
documents, it's difficult to put the complete story 
together. But through discussions with UE staff 
and members, study of the press and literature of 
the strike, as well as personal experience with 
G + W's brand of labor-management relations, 
we can reconstruct this important chapter of the 
labor movement. 
The strike of 1982 had its origins in G + W's 
decision to reverse Morse policies that were more 
than a century old. The Morse Cutting Tool 
company was organized as a family firm in New 
Bedford, Mass., in 1864. It was this country's 
first twist drill manufactory, producing the bits 
used in household drills as well as in heavier in-
dustrial models. 
When the UE organized the company in 1941, 
it was still a family firm. Local 277 built its 
power on the shop floor. When a dispute arose, 
the local fought at the point of production, by 
refusing overtime, slowing down, or refusing to 
cooperate until management resolved the issue. 
This approach worked; in forty years, Local 277 
had to bring only six disputes to arbitration, and 
struck only once, in 1976. Management would 
sometimes ask the local, "Why don't you guys 
arbitrate it?" hoping they would take that route 
rather than the more costly and effective tradi-
tional one. 
But when G+W took over the company in 
1968, as part of its drive to acquire manufactur-
ing operations, things at Morse began to change. 
Most obvious was the way management began to 
milk the plant, using profits for investments else-
where, rather than for maintaining and reequip-
ing the New Bedford facility. 
Labor management relations with G+W were 
generally normal. This was true in New Bedford 
and at other G+W facilities around the country. 
Of course, there were disputes and conflicts, but 
there were successful efforts by the parties to re-
solve them. Management would fight at times, 
but there was formal recognition of the union's 
integrity and of its right to improve the condition 
of its members. Then in 1981, G + W decided to 
take on the union, not only UE Local 277, but all 
the 26 unions representing the conglomerate's 
farflung employees. At the stockholders' meet-
ing in 1981, Chairman of the Board Charles 
Bluhdorn announced that, despite the company's 
record earnings, "we are going to propose a six-
month freeze on all wages at G+W and a reduc-
tion of bonuses.... There may have to be a drastic 
reduction in terms of compensation both at man-
agement and at workers' level.... We may have to 
scrap a lot of the agreements...because we have 
to be competitive." 
Early in 1981, G + W unsuccessfully threatened 
a Steelworker local at Taylor Forge in Cicero, Il-
linois, with loss of jobs if it didn't freeze the pen-
sion for 10 years and stop criticizing management 
in the local union newspaper. That spring, they 
tried to take the Cost of Living Allowance from 
UAW Local 195 at Windsor Bumper in Windsor, 
Ontario, and in the process provoked a sit-in 
strike and were forced to retreat. Other locals like 
UAW 1271 in Danville, Illinois, also fought their 
efforts, successfully getting an injunction 
against moving out jobs after refusing to accept 
mid-contract concessions. But as time passed, 
more often than not, G + W squeezed conces-
sions out of the unions. Eight locals including 
those at Super Tool in Michigan, Eagle Signal 
in Iowa, and finally Taylor Forge in Cicero all 
signed agreements representing a retreat from 
previous gains. 
In January of 1982, corporate management 
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told Local 277 leaders that unless they agreed to 
meet four conditions, production would be shift-
ed to Super Tool in Michigan, where the local 
had already granted concessions. When the local 
agreed, it did no good. On March 12, G + W 
charged that workers were "all over-paid at 
Morse" and loaded some equipment on a truck 
for shipment to Michigan. The local leaders told 
members in a leaflet: "If there was ever any 
doubt in anyone's mind about the Company's 
good faith, the company destroyed all its credi-
bility. Apparently their purpose was not simply 
to cut costs and save money on this project. What 
they really want is for the entire shop to take the 
Super Tool pay-cuts and bend to management's 
demands, turning Morse into a sweat shop. There 
will be a noon-time rally for all members today 
outside the Union Hall to protest this Company 
double cross." The union filed a complaint with 
the National Labor Relations Board, charging 
that the company had illegally removed the 
machines. 
G+ W said, "If 
you don't give 
concessions, you will 
lose your jobs." 
G+ W made it clear: 
Not only did they 
want to lower labor 
costs at Morse, they 
were going to humble 
UE Local 277. 
G + W management, led by Bob Spears, who 
had been involved in the negotiations at Windsor 
Bumper and Taylor Forge, faced UE Local 277 
determined to change labor-manageittent rela-
tions at Morse. Spears told the local th&t they had 
been a "thorn in the side of G + W" arid that 
they had been the most militant of G+W's man-
ufacturing locals. As one UE staff person said, 
"It was clear G + W meant to play hardball. 
G + W said, 'If you don't give concessions, you 
will lose your jobs'." G + W made it clear: Not 
only did they want to lower labor costs at Morse. 
They were going to humble UE Local 277. 
Ten days later, G + W presented new terms to 
Local 277 bargainers. Morse Cutting Tool would 
not remain in New Bedford unless the union: 
1. Reduced night shift bonus from 10% of ear-
nings to 25C per hour. 
2. Cut out 3 paid holidays. 
3. Eliminated 3 sick and personal days. 
4. Reduced maximum vacation from 6 to 4 
weeks. 
5. Reduced wages and fringe benefits $4.40 per 
hour. 
6. Eliminated insurance for laid off workers 
and early retirees. 
7. Eliminated severance pay for retired work-
ers. 
8. Established mandatory overtime. 
Union leaders denied that wage rates were out 
of line, publishing data showing that employees 
of Morse received less than the workers at Union 
Twist Drill and Greenfield Tap and Die, Morse's 
chief competitors. After informing their mem-
bership of G + W's position, the local took a 
strike vote. Union members voted over several 
days in the union hall by secret ballot. The final 
tally was: 415-yes, 7-no. 
On April 20, G + W added to its list of de-
mands: the right to re-grade all jobs; the right to 
transfer temporarily; reduction of breaks; com-
plete control over incentive work and records; re-
duction in size of the union bargaining commit-
tee; elimination of the dental plan; and a require-
ment that active employees pay part of their 
health insurance policy. 
Local 277 leaders did not want to wage a long 
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.. .Workers at Morse knew that the 
problems of Morse were not high labor 
costs.... To identify labor costs as the main 
problem was a crude move on the part of 
G+W to opportunistically take advantage of 
the economic climate. 
defensive strike. They knew that with the cutting 
tool industry in a slump, G+W could easily ab-
sorb a loss of production. The political climate 
was bad, with Reagan in the White House and 
union locals making concessions throughout the 
country. Another factor at Morse was the large 
number of senior workers. In some situations, 
this strata of workers had played a conservative 
role around concession bargaining, being willing 
to concede on wages with the hope of holding on-
to their jobs long enough to retire. Finally, at 
$8.29 an hour, Morse workers' wages were high-
er than those for other industrial workers in New 
Bedford. A long defensive strike over wages that 
were higher than most in the community could 
sway local public opinion against them and deny 
them the encouragement they would need in the 
small tight community of New Bedford. 
Despite their recognition that a strike over con-
cessions would be difficult, workers at Morse 
knew that the problems of Morse were not high 
labor costs. Over the last 14 years, they had seen 
how G+W had drained and mismanaged the 
plant. They knew what they made in comparison 
to other workers in the cutting tool industry. To 
identify labor costs as the main problem was a 
crude move on the part of G+W to opportunisti-
cally take advantage of the economic climate. 
What the local had to do was to meet G+W head 
on over the real sources of Morse's ills. 
But was there an alternative to a traditional 
strike? Local 277 leaders decided to take the of-
fensive, making Gulf+Western's disinvestment 
the issue rather than wage concessions. To help 
them, they called on the Industrial Cooperative 
Association (ICA) of Somerville, Massachu-
setts, to investigate their hunch that G + W's pol-
icies were the real source of Morse's problems. 
ICA did an in-depth investigation of Gulf+ 
Western's management of the Morse plant, inter-
viewing shop stewards, industry experts, Wall 
Street analysts, Morse customers, its sales force, 
and middle-level management. What emerged 
was a picture of systematic corporate disinvest-
ment. Since 1968, Gulf+Western had drained 
capital from Morse, using its profits to feed other 
operations. ICA found that in the years 1977-
82, G+W invested less than $800,000 in new 
equipment for its New Bedford operation, far 
less than its competitors were investing in rival 
plants. 
The study not only clarified that labor costs 
were not the source of Morse's ills but raised a 
more alarming possibility. Eventually, this 
"milking process" would leave Morse dry and 
production would be shifted to new areas, leav-
ing Local 277 members without jobs, and New 
Bedford without its industrial base. As Local 
President Rod Poineau told the Providence, 
Rhode Island, Journal, concessions wouldn't 
solve the problem of Morse: "Instead, they 
would just be financing Gulf+Western's 
move." 
The ICA study not only convinced Local 277 
of the futility of efforts to save jobs by conceding 
wages, it also suggested the potential to enlist al-
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lies in the struggle—the people of New Bedford 
who were also victims of the destructive policies 
of the corporate outsider. Together, the union 
and the community would challenge the sacred 
rights of corporations to do whatever they want-
ed with their money, including shutting down a 
profitable factory. For the local UE leaders, the 
cynicism so frequently felt by unionists during 
1982—"They're too big. You can't do anything 
about it"—evaporated. 
After weeks of preparation, the local launched 
its counter offensive. On April 27, it held a lunch-
eon and press conference at the local Holiday 
Inn. The study by ICA was presented by ICA 
business analyst Jan Saglio and reinforced by 
Bennett Harrison. Over 100 community, politi-
cal, religious, and union leaders, as well as repre-
sentatives of the press, heard the presentation. A 
week prior to the contract expiration date, the 
battle lines had been clearly drawn. 
The union presented its recommendations for 
a settlement asking for a one-year contract which 
would include: 
1. Wage increases of 7.4%. 
2. Increases in pension, life insurance, and 
sickness and accident benefits totalling 7.4%. 
3. A settlement agreement if G + W closed the 
plant. 
The company rejected the union proposals. 
Hours before the contract expired, G + W re-
duced the latest demand of $1.90 cut in wages to 
51C per hour in an effort to avoid the impending 
strike. Local 277 rejected the gimmick, calling it 
"blackmail." 
f * J>~ p S l , \r^m^ 
The Strike—The Workers. 
On Friday, May 7, at midnight, the contract ex-
pired. The following Monday, hundreds of strik-
ers began picketing Morse's two plants. Their 
strike was dramatically different from most 
strikes in these times, for Local 277 used tactics 
that were more common in the turbulent 1930's. 
Members were kept informed about the strike is-
sues; they were mobilized regularly; they organ-
ized support among other workers and neigh-
bors; and they worked to meet each others' 
needs. 
Union leaders informed members about devel-
opments daily. Beginning with the negotiating 
period, more than eleven reports told members 
what was taking place. Once the strike began, 
Local 277 held rallies every Monday morning. In 
these meetings, strikers were kept abreast of the 
details of the discussions with management. Lo-
cal President Rod Poineau commented to the 
press after one meeting, two months into the 
strike, "We're even more united. We went down 
the line, point by point, on every proposal, and 
there was no opposition [to the union's original 
proposal]." 
A major part of any strike or negotiation is 
the company's effort to negotiate around the 
leadership of the local. The company tries to in-
fluence a part of the membership to fight for a 
settlement or to challenge the legitimacy of the 
leadership's position. In the course of negotia-
tions, G + W leaked a "memo from T.A. 
Holden" which, from a "neutral" position, 
defended the company's stance and cited 
^ f *w .ppf -JPWB] 
"facts" to weaken the resolve of Local 277. The 
leadership turned this attack to its own advan-
tage by a detailed exposure of the incident in a 
leaflet. It then became a clear example of the 
company's underhanded methods. 
The picket line was not a handful of strikers at 
each gate. Large lines of strikers surrounded both 
plants each week day. Since the UE doesn't have 
a large strike fund, strikers were not paid for 
picket duty, although when the local started to 
distribute food, picket line participation was re-
quired for recipients. 
Leadership initiated other ways to encourage 
mass participation. For example, the Morse strik-
ers set up their own kitchen to serve meals and 
snacks. Kitchen work was part of picket duty. 
Strikers organized the meals, cooked, and wash-
ed dishes. They also carried out food drives in the 
community and at neighboring plants. 
Strikers were regularly called on to help, 
whether it meant attending a City Council meet-
ing or being part of the Speakers' Bureau which 
took their story to clubs and public gatherings. 
A workshop was set up and strikers silkscreened 
posters about their strike, which would later be 
distributed throughout the city and displayed in 
the windows of businesses. During a city festi-
val, strikers manned a table to talk with people 
about their efforts. There was even a Communi-
ty Odd Job Committee to solicit part-time work 
such as painting, roofing, and cleaning yards to 
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help strikers make ends meet. 
Of course, everything didn't run smoothly nor 
was everyone fully integrated. Some strikers had 
real problems that the strike deeply exacerbated, 
some had a different opinion of what should have 
been done. Leadership, in anticipation of these 
kinds of problems, made home visits to the strik-
ers and their families. They solicited their con-
cerns, criticisms, and problems. Six weeks into 
the strike, which is often a critical moment in any 
strike, David Cameron, President of Morse Cut-
ting Tool, boasted that there would soon be a 
*'back-to-work" movement. There were a hand-
ful of people who could have been influenced by 
such an effort, but the home visits allowed the lo-
cal to identify problems and deal with them. The 
"back-to-work movement" was nipped in the 
bud. Some union members did see home visits as 
an invasion of their privacy, but most liked hav-
ing someone come over, showing concern, and 
creating an informal context where the awkward 
and difficult problems of a long strike could be 
discussed in private. 
Everything that was initiated in the strike was 
geared to maximize the active participation of 
strikers, getting them directly involved in organ-
izing and serving the needs of the other strikers 
and in broadening their base of support. Not on-
ly were the specific tasks accomplished, but the 
high spirit of the strikers and their sense of solid-
arity was maintained. 
"...We haven't got 
the money to fight 
them, so the only 
way is through 
people." 
I U 
The Strike—The Community. 
The most unique aspect of the Morse Strike was 
the ability of the local to mobilize a broad and 
diverse base of support in the community. All the 
support wasn't directly for the strike. There were 
state and local political figures, members of the 
local Chamber of Commerce, community per-
sonalities—all with different interests and cer-
tainly not uniform in their support for militant 
trade unionism. But they could become part of a 
common front against G + W*s policy of disin-
vestment. This policy, in the long run, would af-
fect their businesses or professions by contribut-
ing to the industrial decay of New Bedford. The 
UE staff and local leadership created a variety of 
opportunities for these differing levels of support 
to be expressed. 
At the heart of the ability to gather this support 
was UE Local 277*s exposure of G+W's disin-
vestment policy. Citizens from all walks of life in 
industrial communities have witnessed big com-
panies draining people and resources dry, and 
then leaving. They have witnessed this form of 
economic rape before, but had been unable to 
really identify how the violation was taking place. 
The campaign around disinvestment in New Bed-
ford helped them to precisely identify the prob-
lem. Not only did the community support open 
up another front that G + W was forced to deal 
with. It also contributed to reinforcing the com-
mitment and unity of the strikers. They weren't 
viewed as greedy union members trying to protect 
their high wages. Instead, they became the lead-
ers in a fight against corporate policies which 
were hurting almost everyone in New Bedford. 
UE Local 277 set up a Community Outreach 
Committee, consisting of staff representative II-
lene Carver and strikers Ray Cote, Al Strollo, 
John Waring, and Russ Mello. The effectiveness 
of this committee stimulated broader interest in 
the strike in Massachusetts and around the coun-
try. The kick-off for their campaign was the lun-
cheon on April 27, where the ICA study was re-
leased to the press. The Community Outreach 
Committee prepared for the luncheon carefully, 
meeting with reporters as well as community 
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At the heart of the battle in New Bedford 
•. .was a low budget effort with hard work, 
courage, ingenuity, and a lot of shoe leather. 
leaders in advance, disclosing to them what they 
were learning about G + W and soliciting help in 
the campaign. More than 100 local community, 
religious, labor and political leaders attended as 
well as the press. They heard President Poineau, 
Jan Saglio, and Bennett Harrison expose the de-
structive policies of G + W, and they were in-
formed about the character of negotiations. Such 
a strong start to their efforts helped to mobilize 
antagonism to this "outside" company and to 
shatter the skepticism that nothing could be done 
about it. 
Two days before the contract expired, Local 
277 released an impressive list of members of a 
"Citizens Committee to Support the Morse 
Workers." Labor members included leaders 
from the Longshoremen, Clothing and Textile 
Workers, Bricklayers, IBEW, Fishlumpers, Gar-
ment Workers, Auto and Rubber workers, Roof-
ers, Firefighters, Policemen and others. Politi-
cians included State Senators and Representa-
tives, a U.S. Congressman, the District Attorney, 
and several City Councilors. Also represented 
were clergymen, senior organizations, university 
faculty, and community representatives. The 
breadth of this list reflects the efforts strikers 
made to involve their political leaders and reli-
gious and community leaders. 
This immediate evidence of support created 
opportunities for even broader activity. Working 
with a few members of the City Council, the 
strikers were able to get a resolution introduced 
and passed on May 13. This resolution, while not 
calling for support of the strike, did speak direct-
ly and strongly to the problems caused by 
G+W's policy of disinvestment. To ensure the 
resolution's passage, Local 277 brought 150 
strikers to the Council meeting. Getting the 
point, one councilor commented, "I don't know 
where the G+W headquarters are located, but I 
know where the 500 people in that shop live and 
they represent 500 votes." Two weeks later, a 
similar resolution passed the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives. 
Some councilors pressed the disinvestment is-
sue further, one suggesting establishing a picket 
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CITY OF NEW BEDFORD 
IN CITY COUNCIL 
May 13, 1982 
WHEREAS, The future of Morse Cutting Tools is in 
serious jeopardy; and 
WHEREAS, During the last.two decades, Morse and almost 
all the major plants in New Bedford were bought 
by conglomerates and now are run by people out-
side our City; and 
WHEREAS, No community" can ever achieve economic security 
when these conglomerates are able to buy up 
plants, drain -them and then close down without 
regard to the local area; and 
.WHEREAS, The results of a recently published study 
concerning Gulf & Western's investment and 
management practices show strong evidence 
that Gulf <& Western is disinvesting from Morse 
and raise serious questions about the company's 
intentions of continuing to operate here; and 
WHEREAS, Morse Cutting Tools is the first and oldest 
cutting tool business and has been a major 
employer for the City of New Bedford for 
more than a century; and 
WHEREAS, Morse also has provided taxes for our City, 
payrolls to local merchants, and is a 
strong asset to the economic health of 
our community; and 
WHEREAS-, The reputation xxt .Morse Cutting Tools continues 
to be very good and the long-term outlook for 
the machine tool business is strong and expanding. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That we do everything possible within 
the jurisdiction of the City Council to insure Morse Cutting Tools will 
survive in New Bedford under the present or alternate ownership. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That we call on Gulf & Western to state their 
plans for future investment to make Morse competitive and keep it a viable 
operation - and to assure jobs for our community. 
Councillor Kruger on behalf of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers 
of America, Local 277 
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They have witnessed 
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line in front of corporate headquarters in New 
York City. In an effort to break the strikers' ini-
tiative in the community, G+W set up a special 
meeting inside the plant for the Council with four 
people from corporate headquarters. Despite a 
full presentation from G+W aimed at refuting 
the ICA study, the Councilors held firm. 
In July, the City Council invited G+W to use 
industrial revenue bonds to modernize the plant. 
At a meeting of more than 100 strikers, ten weeks 
into the strike, Councilor George Rogers said, 
"Our people should not be sacrificed. New Bed-
ford should not be a Little Big Horn. We should 
keep [G+W] from walking out." Councilor 
Saltzman suggested that if the company refused 
the revenue bonds, the city could help workers 
get tax-free bonds to buy Morse. "If the com-
pany is going to take that attitude," he said, "the 
union should take over Morse Cutting Tools." 
Support came from surprising places. The Po-
lice Union supported UE Local 277 strongly. 
There was real solidarity between police and 
strikers, so much so that President David Camer-
on threatened to bring in State Troopers. The 
hreat brought Cameron into conflict with anoth-
er strike supporter—Ronald Pina, the District 
Attorney. Pina commented, "I control the state 
police in Bristol County and I will never allow 
them to be used to break a strike." 
To consolidate their public support, UE Local 
277 launched a petition campaign calling on 
G+W to modernize Morse or to sell it to some-
one who would. Local President Rod Poineau 
commented, "...We haven't got the money to 
fight them, so the only way is through people." 
The petition concluded, "G-f W has no right to 
milk Morse, run it into the ground and then liqui-
date it." The strikers took the petitions along 
with thousands of leaflets to the streets, to plant 
gates, to the city festival, to shopping malls, and 
to churches. Their silkscreened posters, with a 
Fred Wright cartoon depicting a Morse cow be-
ing milked, advising people to "Sign Petition 
Here" were displayed in businesses throughout 
the area. 
G+W didn't like this approach. One vending 
machine company which serviced the Morse Tool 
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plant put up one of the signs; David Cameron 
personally called and ordered them to remove it. 
Local 277 created ways for the community to 
show their support, such as donating food to the 
strike kitchen or directly to the striking families. 
St. Mary's Orphanage not only contributed food 
but hooked Local 277 up with their food suppli-
ers. Our Lady of the Assumption Church let the 
local use its kitchen. Davidson Meat Produce 
gave hot dogs, Wonder Bread gave bread, Meta 
Fish Company gave fish, and Stan and Paul's 
Atlantic Appliances gave a microwave oven. 
Churches and clergy were actively involved, 
giving supplies, services, and space to the strik-
ers. Father Joseph Mulligan, a Jesuit priest from 
Detroit who has written extensively on G+W's | policies in the Dominican Republic, came to 
New Bedford in June. He spoke to a number of 
the local clergy as well as to a rally of 250 people. 
He assured his audience that they were not alone 
in opposing the conglomerate's exploitative poli-
cies. 
Late in June, G+W tried to break the momen-
tum of the strike. The company announced it was 
cutting off insurance to strikers and to those who 
had retired before age 65. Local 277 immediately 
took the offensive, announcing it would file suit 
in U.S. District Court. More important, the 
union mobilized public pressure. Retirees set up 
a protest picket line around the plant and turned 
up in large numbers for an informational rally 
on July 8. City Councilor George Rogers told 
the rally that G+W's actions were "unconscion-
able." Two days later, the company reinstated 
its insurance coverage, because the issue was 
"detracting from the...central issues...." UE 
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staffer Illene Carver commented, "It shows that 
G+W is suceptible to public pressure. The com-
pany canceled the benefits, but the people 
organized themselves with public pressure and 
won them back." 
Bob Spears, one of the corporate architects of 
the anti-union campaign, asked UE staffers, 
"You're not playing fair. Why not just a regular 
strike? Even if we settle, how can we run a busi-
ness in this community after you have ruined our 
reputation?" 
Favorable press coverage reinforced commun 
ity support for the strikers. By cultivating good 
relations with local reporters, Local 277 got ex-
cellent coverage in the press. They had consist-
ently good coverage in the New Bedford Stand-
ard Times, the Providence Journal and the Bos-
ton Globe. G+W's aggressive pursuit of the 
press was less effective. Early in the strike, the 
company took out two full-page ads. The more 
it tried to deny its disinvestment, the less it was 
believed. G+W held a long press conference in 
response to the ICA study: it was so ineffective, 
one local business editor walked out after half an 
hour. 
Furthermore, the union leadership's work with 
the national media paid off in favorable coverage 
in Business Week, the Wall Street Journal, the 
Christian Science Monitor, and on National 
Public Radio. This publicity reinforced the 
strikers' resolve, gave strength to their strike sup-
port activities, and tarnished G+W's reputation. 
"Maybe it's a long shot, but if we go out of 
business, well go out with our dignity." 
The Strike—The Labor Movement-
Over the years, UE had built strong ties with the 
rest of organized labor in the New Bedford area; 
now, practically every local union joined the Citi-
zens Committee to Support the Morse Strikers. 
On July 26, Local 277 organized an all union sup-
port rally which reflected the strength of their 
ties. The Standard Times, under the headline, 
"Union Speakers Cite Class War at Rally for 
Morse,*' reported on speeches given by the presi-
dent of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, representa-
tives of the New Bedford and Cape Cod Labor 
Councils, strikers from Browne and Sharp in 
Rhode Island and Westinghouse in Pittsburgh, 
and representatives from a variety of other 
unions. Rank-and-file unionists in New Bedford 
regularly received informational leaflets at their 
plant gates about the progress of the strike and 
were solicited for money and food. 
As the strike continued, word spread to other 
locals across the country. UE Local 277 is part of 
a multi-union Cutting Tool Conference. After 
being appraised of the situation at Morse, the 
conference passed a resolution in firm support of 
the Morse workers: "The member locals of this 
conference will participate in demonstrations, 
rallies, and other methods of support when need-
ed, until such time as the companies withdraw 
their uncalled for concession demands/' Unions 
at G+W plants were particularly interested. Lo-
cals from the Steelworkers, Machinists, Auto-
workers, as well as the UE asked their Interna-
tionals to request a conference to be convened by 
the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-
CIO to discuss G+W's strategy and to establish a 
union response. Although neither the IUD nor 
the International unions called a conference, the 
channels of communication G+W locals devel-
oped during the strike enabled them to begin ex-
changing information. In a very real way, the 
battle fought by UE Local 277 became a model 
and a symbol for other unions facing the demand 
for concessions or suffering the effects of disin-
vestment. 
The Strike Ends. 
On August 9, after 13 weeks of the strike, facing 
growing mobilization against its disinvestment 
policies, and facing the determination of the UE 
strikers, G+W backed down. It withdrew its de-
mand for concessions in wages and benefits, and 
proposed a contract with modest wage, pension, 
and insurance improvements. The workers rati-
fied the new 33-month pact overwhelmingly and 
returned to work. Two weeks later, they and their 
supporters packed the biggest ballroom in New 
Bedford—the Lincoln Park—and celebrated 
their victory with a ham and bean dinner. They 
had won the battle against a huge conglomerate. 
Lessons from Morse. 
In today's complicated struggles, many unions 
and union leaders look to a high tech approach, 
to professional consulting firms, media pack-
ages, and direct mail campaigns. At the heart of 
the battle in New Bedford, by contrast, was a low 
budget effort with hard work, courage, ingen-
uity, and a lot of shoe leather. Old-fashioned 
qualities. But these old-fashioned qualities, com-
bined with a concrete analysis of corporate ex-
ploitation, provided the basis for an aggressive 
campaign. 
At least some of the major lessons from the 
Morse Strike are: 
1. Think strategically: UE leadership read the 
early warning signals and prepared for G+W's 
attack. Before their contract expired, they had 
commissioned and released the ICA study, held 
the community luncheon, formed a community 
support committee, gained a pledge of support 
from the Cutting Tool Conference, and estab-
lished their various strike committees. But there 
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ras much more to their leadership than simply 
lanning ahead. They not only organized their 
rincipal force—the local members—in carrying 
ut a strike. They also developed a broad second-
ry base of support—the sectors who were mob-
ized against disinvestment but not necessarilyy 
i support of militant unionism, such as the City 
Council. Effectively developing the interrelation-
hip between these principle and secondary 
orces helped to at least neutralize segments in 
he community who are traditionally against la-
>or such as the Chamber of Commerce, parts f>f 
he press, and political figures. The Morse Strike, 
is determined as it was, did not include police 
iolence, strong negative reaction in the press, 
ed-baiting, or other ingredients frequently seen 
n sharp labor struggles. 
2. Take the Offensive—Define the Issues: UE 
^ocal 277 did not wait for. G+W to charge that 
inion greed was threatening Morse Tool's viabil-
ty. Instead, the UE went on the attack. By re-
easing the ICA study to the press before the 
•trike began, Local 277 defined the issue: The 
conglomerate was milking New Bedford dry, 
while preparing to abandon it. This approach en-
abled the UE to challenge capital's "sacred 
rights" to move wherever it pleased. Although 
that sounds like a radical thing in these times, it 
worked. Strike activists were energized by the at-
tack on G+W. Combined with tactical aggres-
siveness on the picket line, in the press, in the 
courts, and in the community, UE Local 277 was 
able to keep the conglomerate giant stumbling 
and on the defensive. 
Equally important, townspeople joined to-
gether against the unbridled power of an outsider 
whose behavior violated community norms. 
G+W may have a lot of economic power, but in 
New Bedford, it lacked legitimacy. 
By planning ahead, and defining the issues in 
the strike as corporate disinvestment, UE Local 
277 ensured that its members' spirits would not 
break. But probably the most importent senti-
ment which made all of this possible was the gut 
feeling in the workers of Morse. Preserving the 
integrity and advances the union had made 
through decades of struggle was worth a bitter 
fight to the end, even facing possible defeat. Vic-
tory in this battle was by no means guaranteed. 
Particularly in the beginning, there had to be 
lonely and difficult moments for some leaders 
who fought for a course which was leading into 
some unfamiliar and possibly dangerous ter-
ritory. This spirit was best expressed by Local 
President Rod Poineau, who commented, 
"Maybe it's a long shot, but if we go out of 
business, we'll go out with our dignity." 
It was a long battle, and strikers suffered se-
vere financial pressures. By holding out, strikers 
offered a beacon of hope to trade unionists 
around the country who are wracked by econom-
ic depression and political defeat. The militant, 
democratic unionism of Local 277, backed up 
with the research of the Industrial Cooperative 
Association, provide hope that American labor 
can do more than retreat with dignity in the hard 
times ahead. • 
